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"Some courts," wrote the Supreme Court of Georgia over a cen-
tury ago, "live by correcting the errors of others and adhering to their
own.... [T]hey must discover error abroad and be discreetly blind to
its commission at home."1 This comment is peculiarly appropriate in
light of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma's 1994 decision in Southwest-
ern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission.2 That
case bids fair to become a leading case on bias in administrative agen-
cies - but unfortunately as an example of an egregiously wrong deci-
sion on the subject. However, before we discuss the case it is
necessary to say something about bias in agencies and its relationship
to the rule-making/adjudication distinction that is so crucial through-
out administrative law.
* Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law
1. Ellison v. Georgia RLR. & Banking, 13 S.E. 809, 810 (Ga. 1891).
2. 873 P.2d 1001 (Okla.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 191 (1994).
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I. RULE-MAKING VERSUS ADJUDICATION
It is hornbook administrative law that "a 'fair trial in a fair tribu-
nal is a basic requirement of due process.' .. . This applies to adminis-
trative agencies which adjudicate, as well as to courts."3  An
administrative decision may not stand if either the hearing officer or
the agency was infected with legal bias. This has been a basic adminis-
trative law principle for over a century. Justice Field declared, as early
as 1884:
It need hardly be said that it is an elementary principle of natural
justice that no man shall sit in judgment where he is interested, no
matter how unimpeachable his personal integrity. The principle is
not limited to cases arising in the ordinary courts of law in the regu-
lar administration of justice, but extends to all cases where a tribu-
nal of any kind is established to decide upon the rights of different
parties.4
In the same case, the Court indicated that the rule against bias applied
to an agency authorized to fix the rates charged by a company supply-
ing water to San Francisco.5 Such an agency, said the Court, may not
act in "violation of the principle that no man shall be a judge in his
own case."
6
Application of the rule against bias in administrative agencies
turns upon what the Supreme Court has called the "recognized dis-
tinction in administrative law between proceedings for the purpose of
promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and
proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases
on the other."7 This fundamental distinction between rule-making
and adjudication is basic in administrative law.
As a starting point, there is a constitutional parallel between rule-
making and statute-making procedural requirements. Agencies en-
gaged in rule-making are, as a general proposition, no more subject to
constitutional procedural requirements than is the legislature engaged
in enacting a statute.8 "Proceedings which are legislative in nature do
3. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)).
4. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 364 (1884).
5. Id. at 354; see also id. at 364 (Field, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 354.
7. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973).
8. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
[Vol. 30:461
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not implicate judicial processes and do not require application of the
judicial standards" that govern agency adjudications.9
Accordingly, courts have held that rule-making is not governed
by the strict rule against bias that prevails in adjudicatory proceed-
ings.10 Judicial roles must not be imposed upon administrators when
they perform functions very different from those of judges. The
model of a completely neutral and detached adjudicator is not the ap-
propriate model for an administrator exercising a legislative function,
who translates broad statutory commands into concrete social policies.
The disqualification of a rule-maker will not be ordered "absent the
most compelling proof that he is unable to carry out his duties in a
constitutionally permissible manner.""
The quote above is from Association of National Advertisers v.
FTC12 - now the leading case on the matter. The case arose out of a
rule-making proceeding instituted by the FTC under the Magnuson-
Moss Act. 3 The Commission's proposed regulations imposed sub-
stantial restrictions on television advertising aimed at children (hence
they were popularly dubbed the "Kid Vid" rules). Plaintiffs moved to
disqualify FTC Chairman Pertschuk from participating in the pro-
ceeding because he had so prejudged the issues involved that he could
not judge them fairly.14 The motion was based upon statements made
by Pertschuk in speeches, articles, interviews, memoranda, and corre-
spondence which showed that he had already decided the issues in-
volved in the proceeding.15 In particular, plaintiffs cited a speech in
which he had asserted that children's TV advertising might be decep-
tive, that children needed protection from such advertising, and that
the FTC would take necessary protective measures.' 6 After unsuc-
cessfully presenting the issue to the commission, plaintiffs sought a
court order barring Pertschuk from further participation in the
proceeding.' 7
9. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 873 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okla.),
cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 191 (1994).
10. United Farm Workers of Am. v. Arizona Agric. Employment Relations Bd., 1983 WL
21393 at *5, reh'g granted and opinion withdrawn, 707 F.2d 1023, reh'g granted, 727 F.2d 1475
(9th Cir. 1983).
11. Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1154 n.2.
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The district court granted plaintiffs' motions for summary judg-
ment, holding that the FTC Chairman had demonstrated legal bias
which required his disqualification. 8 Yet, even if the district court
was correct in disqualifying an administrative adjudicator in similar
circumstances, it should be stressed that the agency here was engaged,
not in adjudication, but in rule-making. Should the agency in such
case be held to the bias standard which governs adjudications? This
was the crucial question decided by the court of appeals in the Na-
tional Advertisers case.19
Answering in the negative, the appellate opinion of Judge Tamm
stressed the difference between rule-making and adjudication. 0
"When a proceeding is classified as rule-making," it stated; "due pro-
cess ordinarily does not demand procedures more rigorous than those
provided by Congress. 21 The disqualification standard here must be
consistent with this principle. It follows that "[w]e never intended the
Cinderella rule [governing bias in adjudications2 ] to apply to a rule-
making procedure such as the one under review. '  On the contrary,
the concept underlying the rule against bias for an adjudicator "is sim-
ply an inapposite role model for an administrator who must translate
broad statutory commands into concrete social policies" - i.e. what
the administrator does when engaged in rule-making.24
This case, involving "assertions of an agency head that he discerns
abuses that may require corrective regulation,"' well illustrates why
the adjudicatory bias standard should not apply to rule-making. As
Judge Leventhal explained in a concurring opinion,
[o]ne can hypothesize beginning an adjudicatory proceeding with an
open mind, indeed a blank mind, a tabula rasa devoid of any previ-
ous knowledge of the matter. In sharp contrast, one cannot even
conceive of an agency conducting a rule-making proceeding unless
it had delved into the subject sufficiently to become concerned that
there was an evil or abuse that required regulatory response.2 6
As already stated, National Advertisers turns upon the parallel
between rule-making and the enactment of statutes. That parallel is
18. Id. at 1156.
19. Id. at 1168.
20. Id. at 1168-69.
21. Id. at 1165-66.
22. See infra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.
23. National Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1168.
24. Id. at 1168-69.
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as true in a case where the rule against bias is at issue as in other cases.
"Indeed, any suggestion that congressmen may not prejudge factual
and policy issues is fanciful."2 7 The legislative analogy requires the
same result in the case of an administrator engaged in rule-making.
However, the National Advertisers court did not follow the congres-
sional analogy to its logical conclusion, that of an absolute refusal in
any case to disqualify the administrator engaged in rule-making. In-
stead, the Court indicated that there are cases in which an administra-
tor may be disqualified even in a rule-making proceeding.,' That is
true said Judge Tamm, when "the purpose of [the rule-making pro-
ceeding] would be frustrated if a Commission member had reached an
irrevocable decision on whether a rule should be issued prior to the
Commission's final action."2 9 This means that in rule-making an ad-
ministrator should "be disqualified... when there has been a clear
and convincing showing that the agency member has an unalterably
closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the proceeding.
'
"30
The possibility of disqualification under the unalterably closed
mind test distinguishes the administrative rule-maker from the legisla-
tive statute-maker. The member of Congress or other legislator could
not be disqualified, no matter how closed his mind may be before he
votes on a pending bill. On the other hand, while there is a distinction
between the administrator and the legislator concerning potential dis-
qualification, that distinction may be one without practical difference.
This is true because the unalterably closed mind test "establish[es] a
legal principle that evidence of bias and prejudice would not be dis-
qualifying unless it could surmount a fence that is horse high, pig tight
and bull strong."31
In practice, it is virtually impossible to meet the court's test. This
is shown by the National Advertisers case itself. FTC Chairman Pert-
schuk had plainly concluded that it was necessary to issue a rule im-
posing restrictions on TV advertising aimed at children.32 From his
prerule-making speeches, interviews, memoranda, and correspon-
dence, "[c]an any reasonable person contend that such remarks do not
27. Id. at 1165.
28. Id at 1170.
29. 1l
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1188 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
32. See id. at 1187-92.
1995]
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indicate that he has prejudged TV Advertising and decided that it ex-
ploits children?"'33 Yet, the court concluded that Pertschuk's mind
was not unalterably closed on the matter.34 "The statements do not
demonstrate that Chairman Pertschuk is unwilling or unable to con-
sider rationally argument that a final rule is unnecessary. '35
It is difficult, however, not to conclude that the FTC Chairman's
"public statements repeatedly reveal fixed conclusions upon the pri-
mary issue that the agency proceeding contemplated would only be
determined after the [rule-making proceeding]. '36 As a leading trea-
tise puts it, "[i]f anyone ever evidenced an 'unalterably closed mind'
... it was the FTC Chairman on the issue of children's advertising
... ,37 If Pertschuk did not display an unalterably closed mind, it is
difficult to think of anyone who would meet the court's test.
II. RATE-MAKING AND BIAS
This brings us to Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma
Corporation Commission31 - the case referred to at the beginning of
this article. That case arose out of a telephone rate hearing before the
Commission.39 Southwestern Bell sought a court order disqualifying a
commissioner after he revealed that he had been secretly acting as an
informant in an ongoing FBI investigation into allegedly improper
conduct by company employees involving his fellow commissioners.40
The Oklahoma court recognized that it might have "the power.., to
disqualify a corporation commissioner, if he were sitting in a judicial
capacity."41 However, "[r]ate hearings are legislative in nature."4 To
support this proposition, the court relied upon the 1908 case, Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co.,43 the Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of
33. Id. at 1189.
34. Id. at 1174.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1197 (emphasis in original).
37. 2 KENNEm Cu, DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 9.8 at 88 (3d ed. 1994).
38. 873 P.2d 1001 (Okla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 191 (1994). With the consent of the par-
ties, this writer submitted a brief in support of the petition for certiorari. For a criticism of the
denial of certiorari see Ernest Gellhorn, Supreme Court Docket Skirts Critical Issues, NAT'L W.,
Dec. 5, 1994, at A21.
39. Id. at 1004-05.
40. ld. at 1004.
41. Id. at 1008 (emphasis in original).
42. Id. at 1005.
43. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
[Vol. 30:461
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rate-making as a legislative act,44 as well as Oklahoma decisions to the
same effect.45
Since, according to the court, this was not a judicial proceeding in
which the commissioner was performing an adjudicatory function,
"due process requirements, including neutrality," were not de-
manded.46 The proceeding, says the court,
was unarguably legislative in nature, and while participating in it
Commissioner Anthony was acting in a legislative capacity which
did not require him to comply with judicial standards of conduct.
Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to disqualify Com-
missioner Anthony from participation in this or any other SWB rate
hearing.47
It is undoubtedly true, as already seen, that the strict adjudicatory
rule against bias does not apply in rule-making proceedings. The Na-
tional Advertisers decision to that effect has been followed in more
recent cases.48 Nevertheless, one may wonder whether the commis-
sioner in Southwestern Bell, who had served as an FBI informant
against the company, would not come within the unalterably closed
mind exception laid down by National Advertisers. Could such a com-
missioner really have an open mind in any proceeding involving the
company against which he was informing?
More important is the Southwestern Bell court's answer to the
question of whether the strict rule against bias is applicable to an
agency engaged in rate-making. The United States Supreme Court
confirmed a few years ago that rate-making is legislative in charac-
ter.49 However, that should be only the beginning, not the end, of the
judicial inquiry. Rate-making, such as that in Southwestern Bell, may
be legislative in character, yet it is normally particular in applicability
since it involves the fixing of prices to be charged by utilities or carri-
ers. When an agency fixes the rates charged by a telephone company,
where there is only one company whose rates are being fixed, the im-
pact on that company is virtually that of a judicial decision, and it has
44. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 371 (1989).
45. Southwestern Bell, 873 P2d at 1005 (citing Tarpen v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 769
P.2d 1309 (Okla. 1989); State, ex reL Cartwright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 662 P.2d 675
(Okla. 1983); Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 562 P.2d 507 (Okla. 1977);
Wiley v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 429 P.2d 957 (Okla. 1967)).
46. Southwestern Bell, 873 P.2d at 1006-07.
47. Id. at 1007.
48. Alaska Factory Trawler Ass'n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1987); Housing
Study Group v. Kemp, 736 F. Supp. 321, 331 (D.D.C. 1990).
49. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
1995]
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a due process right to be heard. Regardless of its theoretical legisla-
tive nature, the proceeding is an adversary one, with the company and
the agency as opposing parties who can best present their sides in a
trial-type format.
In particularized rate-making, the required hearing is an eviden-
tiary one, governed by the requirements imposed upon such hearings
in adjudicatory proceedings." As the Southwestern Bell dissent points
out, our administrative law by now has placed individual rate-making
into a special category called on-the-record rule-making.51 This
phrase gives recognition to the accepted constitutional position -
that the legislative process of individual rate-making requires adver-
sarial, trial-type hearings. On-the-record rule-making is now acknowl-
edged to be surrounded by a host of procedural safeguards5 2 _
including the rule against bias. That has been the established law
since the 1884 Supreme Court decision in Spring Valley Water Works
v. Schottler.53 In that case, both the opinion of the Court and the dis-
sent by Justice Field proceed upon the principle that "the rates shall
be established by an impartial tribunal"'54 - one whose members are
not infected by legal bias. To hold the contrary, as Southwestern Bell
does, is to make a decision that, to put it charitably, is worse than a
crime, it is a blunder - contrary to both established administrative
law principles and all the jurisprudence on the matter. In rate-mak-
ing, as in purely adjudicatory proceedings, "appellant was entitled to
an impartial decision-maker who had not prejudged the issues."55
III. ADJUDICATORY BIAs: INTEREST AND PERSONAL BIAS
Without a doubt, a fair hearing in a fair forum is the basic right in
an adjudicatory proceeding - whether in a court or an administrative
agency. "When agency members are performing adjudicatory func-
tions, they must abide by the same disqualification standards that are
50. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 873 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Okla.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 191 (1994).
51. Id. at 1014 (Opala, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1025.
53. 110 U.S. 347, 364 (1884).
54. Id. at 363.
55. Michigan Intra-State Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 504 N.W.2d
677,681 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); see also New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 448
A.2d 272 (Me. 1982).
[Vol. 30:461
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applicable to judges. '5 6 The governing principle here is not the Na-
tional Advertisers rule, but the strict rule against bias that is applicable
in judicial proceedings. "Administrative decision-makers do not bear
all the badges of independence that characterize an Article III judge,
but they are held to the same standard of impartial decision-mak-
ing.",57 Thus, the two types of legal bias that clearly require judges to
recuse themselves: 1) financial interest and 2) personal bias or preju-
dice, will also disqualify administrative adjudicators5 8
Gibson v. Berryhil59 is the leading case showing that a financial
interest requires an administrator to be disqualified. In Gibson, the
Alabama Board of Optometry charged licensed optometrists with un-
professional conduct because they were employed by a corporation. 0
By statute, only members of the Alabama Optometric Association
could be members of the Board, and the Association barred from its
membership optometrists employed by others.6 1 The Court held that
the Board was disqualified by personal interest.62 Success of the
Board's efforts in the case would rebound to the personal benefit of
the Board members since they competed with the optometrists em-
ployed by corporations. Therefore, the Board's financial interest cre-
ated sufficient bias to cause disqualification.
The difficulty with Gibson is that Friedman v. Rogers,63 a more
recent case, rejected a due process attack upon the composition of the
Texas Optometry Board where the governing statute required two-
thirds of the agency members to be members of the professional or-
ganization of optometrists in private practice.6 Can Gibson and
Friedman be reconciled? I have attempted to do so by distinguishing
the two cases.
56. Tennessee Cable Television Ass'n v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 844 S.W.2d 151,164
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
57. Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, resolutions at art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/
810 (1948) ("Everyone is entitled ... to a fair... hearing by an... impartial tribunal, in the
determination of . . . rights and obligations."); Heldman v. Sobol, 846 F. Supp. 285, 289
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 1993) (stating a judge must disqualify himself "(1) Where he has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding ... [or] (4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or
his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding.").
59. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
60. Ld. at 567-68.
61. Id at 567.
62. Id at 579.
63. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
64. Id at 17.
1995]
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In Gibson the Court examined whether personal interests precluded
an impartial hearing after disciplinary proceedings were actually in-
stituted. In Friedman the challenge to the Board's fairness did not
arise from an actual disciplinary proceeding. lying together both
Gibson and Friedman, the result is that an agency composed of or
dominated by representatives of those regulated is not per se inva-
lid. However, its proceedings can be challenged on the ground of
the members' personal interests.65
In other words, though "a general economic interest in the subject
matter is insufficient to disqualify a decision-maker, ' 66 that is not true
where the decision in specific cases would result in possible personal
benefit for the decision-maker.67
More recently, the Court has indicated that not everyone in an
adjudicatory proceeding must be disqualified because of some pecuni-
ary interest. According to Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,6 the disqualifica-
tion requirement does not apply to those engaged in the performance
of prosecuting functions.69 In that case it was claimed that the rule
against bias was violated by a section of the Fair Labor Standards Act
which provides money collected as civil penalties for employment of
child labor must be returned to the Department of Labor as reim-
bursement for amounts expended in determining the violation.70 The
assistant regional administrator imposed a substantial fine on appellee
for child labor violations. 71 After hearing, an administrative law judge
reduced the fine.72 The district court held that the statute's reim-
bursement provision created an impermissible risk of bias because a
regional office's greater effort in uncovering violations could lead to
an increased amount of penalties and a greater share of reimburse-
ments for that office.73 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
financial interest bar was not applicable to the determinations of the
assistant regional administrator, whose functions resemble those of a
prosecutor more than those of a judge.74 The strict requirements of
65. BERNARD ScHwARTz, ADMNISTRATrIvE LAW 341 (3d ed. 1991).
66. 2 KENri CuL' DAvis & PJHRc J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 9.8 at 73 (3d ed. 1994).
67. See id.
68. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
69. Id. at 251-52.
70. Id. at 241.
71. Id. at 240.
72. Id. at 241.
73. Id. at 241-42.
74. Id. at 251-52.
[Vol. 30:461
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neutrality, said the Court, cannot be the same for an administrative
prosecutor as for an adjudicator, who makes the decision in the case.75
A recent case, United States v. Edwardo-Franco,76 demonstrates
how personal bias or prejudice works to disqualify an adjudicator.
That case involved a drug prosecution against four Columbian nation-
als.7 7 The judge made the following remarks about Colombians:
"They don't have too much regard for Judges. They only killed 32
Chief Judges in that nation. Their regard for the judicial system, the
men who run their laws, I'm glad I'm in America.' '78 These remarks
were held to be an indication of extrajudicial bias which demonstrated
that defendants could not receive a fair trial.79
The same would be true of a comparable case in an administra-
tive agency. Such blatant indications of personal bias are, however,
rare. Ordinarily, it is difficult to demonstrate personal bias merely
from adverse comments by an agency official. Thus, the fact that the
hearing officer called petitioner's attorney "smart ass" and "nasty lit-
tle fellow" was ruled not enough to show personal bias.80 Similarly,
bias was not shown by "remarks [at a hearing] by the chairperson and
panel members that, albeit intended as humor, were made at the ex-
pense of the plaintiff," though the court did say that they "lend an air
of impropriety and bias to the hearing."8 1
On the other hand, the hearing officer may demonstrate such par-
tiality in conducting the hearing that personal bias may be presumed.
The case usually cited to illustrate this, NLRB v. Phelps,' was decided
over a half a century ago. In that case the NLRB examiner took over
the prosecution, personally issuing a show cause order converting the
proceeding into one against a corporation not named as respondent.83
The court held that the actions of the examiner prevented a fair and
impartial trial.84
There are comparable recent cases. In one, the hearing officer
declared at the close of the state's evidence, "Okay, now. You have to
75. Id. at 250.
76. 885 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1989).
77. Id at 1005.
78. It- at 1005.
79. Id. at 1007, 1010.
80. Neoplan USA Corp. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 778 P.2d 312 (Colo. Ct. App.
1989).
81. Pet v. Department of Health Serv., 638 A.2d 6, 14 n.11 (Conn. 1994).
82. 136 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1943).
83. It at 564.
84. Id. at 567.
1995]
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convince me that you're not guilty."'85 The court held that this state-
ment showed an improper bias against the individual being tried.86 In
another case, the administrative law judge (ALJ) expressed constant
impatience at plaintiff's procedural requests, meeting them with such
comments as "That's a bunch of nonsense," and continually harassed
plaintiff's attorney.8s The court held that "there was not even the pre-
tense of a full and fair hearing. '' s8
May personal bias be shown by demonstrating that the agency
adjudicator starts with the assumption that the case should be decided
against the private party? Such a novel bias claim was raised in a re-
cent Third Circuit case.89 An unsuccessful claimant for disability ben-
efits challenged the decision denying her benefits on the ground that
the AUI was biased against all disability claimants and was "inclined
in every disability case to deny benefits." 9 The case was certified as a
class action for all claimants who had received or would receive ad-
verse decisions from this AJ. 91 While the case was pending, the
agency conducted its own investigation and, after a detailed examina-
tion of 212 of the AU's cases, concluded that the charge of bias
against claimants was generally unfounded.9 The court held that the
district court could not properly conduct a trial and make findings of
fact regarding the AL's alleged general bias.93 The fact-finding role
in a social security case is exclusively the agency's domain, and the
district court has no fact finding role.94 In this case, where the agency
had conducted an investigation and issued a report, the proper rem-
edy was to seek judicial review of the agency's findings.95 In addition,
there is the broader question of how to establish bias in such a case.
The plaintiff, through discovery, had delved into the AI's decision-
making process by questioning agency personnel who had assisted the
AUJ in writing opinions and sought the AL's notes on cases he had
decided.96 According to the court, such an effort to prove an AU's
thinking and decision-making process "would pose a substantial threat
85. In re Ttmuminia, 527 N.Y.S.2d 673, 675 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
86. Id. at 675.
87. Rosa v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 782, 784-85 (D.NJ. 1988).
88. Id. at 785.
89. Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 1334.
91. Id. at 1335.
92. Id. at 1336.
93. Id. at 1346.
94. Id
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1344-45.
[Vol. 30:461
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to the administrative process. Every AIJ would work under the
threat of being subjected to such treatment if his or her pattern of
decisions displeased any administrative litigant or group with the re-
sources to put together a suit charging bias." 97
IV. COMBINATION AND D=IFRENT ADJUDICATORY LEVELS
The combination of functions has been an outstanding feature of
American administrative agencies since the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act of 1914.98 As a Senate critic described it during the debate
on that statute, the proposed commission was being given "legislative,
judicial, and executive powers .... [T]he powers of all three of the
coordinate branches of the Government are proposed to be delegated
to and vested in this commission." 99 In particular, the FTC-type
agency combines the functions of investigator, prosecutor, and
judge.10 "The Federal Trade Commission investigates charges of
business immorality, ifies a charge in its own name as plaintiff, and
then decides whether the proof sustains the charges it has filed."''1
The same concentration of functions exists in many other agencies.
Unlike a court, which occupies an arbitral position between two con-
senting parties, the agency may be both an interested party and a trier
of the contentions advanced by its counsel at the hearing." 2
Critics have contended that the combination of functions inevita-
bly makes for bias in administrative agencies. As Justice Brennan put
it when he was a state judge, "In a sense the combination of functions
violates the ancient tenet of Anglo-American justice that 'No man
shall be a judge in his own cause." ' 10 3 Despite this, it is settled that
the combination of functions as such is not subject to legal attack. The
leading case is now Withrow v. Larkin."° In that case the lower court
had enjoined a state medical board from suspending a physician's li-
cense because the Board did not satisfy the procedural due process
requirement of having an independent decision-maker rule on the
97. Id. at 1345.
98. 15 U.S.C. §46 (1988).
99. 3 BERNARD SCHwARTZ=, THE ECONoMIc REGULATION OF BusiN-ss AND INDuSRY: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES 1803 (1973) (quoting Senator Shields).
100. FrC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 27 (1929).
101. Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351, 357 (10th Cir. 1936).
102. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 67 F. Supp. 76,79 (D.D.C. 1946), rev'd on other
grounds, 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
103. In re Larsen, 86 A.2d 430, 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952).
104. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
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merits of the charges it had investigated. 10 5 The Supreme Court re-
versed.106 The Court conceded that the combination issue was "sub-
stantial" and one with which legislators and others involved with the
operation of agencies had properly been concerned. 10 7 However, that
hardly supports "the bald proposition applied in this case by the Dis-
trict Court that agency members who participate in an investigation
are disqualified from adjudicating. 10 8 On the contrary, there is no
broad rule that agency members may not investigate, institute pro-
ceedings, and then adjudicate. "The mere exposure to evidence
presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in
itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adver-
sary hearing."109 More recently, the D.C. Circuit explained,
"Withrow's message [is] that a due process challenge directed broadly
to combinations of purposes or functions in the modern administrative
state 'assumes too much."'" 10 However, there is a distinction between
combining functions in an agency and the exercise of inconsistent
functions by the same person. For example, where an adjudicator re-
fers charges against a police officer, he must recuse himself from sit-
ting on the panel that adjudicates those charges.1 '
The same is true where the same person participates at different
levels of the adjudicatory process. Beer Garden, Inc. v. New York
State Liquor Authority,"2 a 1992 New York case, strikingly illustrates
this point. The State Liquor Authority (SLA) had served a nightclub
with notices of proceedings to revoke and suspend its license, charging
various violations of the state's liquor law. 13 The notices were issued
over the stamped signature of "Sharon L. Tillman, Counsel to the Au-
thority.""' 4 An ALT conducted hearings on the revocation and sus-
pension proceedings. 1 5 The AUJ sustained the charges factually and,
without recommendation as to penalty, referred the matter to the
SLA (composed of five Commissioners) for final determination. 1 6 In
105. Id. at 42.
106. Id. at 59.
107. Id. at 51.
108. Id. at 52.
109. Id. at 55.
110. Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1107 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
869 (1988).
111. Scalzi v. City of Altoona, 533 A.2d 1150 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), appeal denied, 551
A.2d 218 (Pa. 1988).
112. 590 N.E.2d 1193 (N.Y. 1992).
113. Id. at 1194.
114. Id.
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the interim, Tillman left her position as Counsel to become an SLA
Commissioner. 17 The Commissioners then voted to adopt the AUL's
findings, sustain the charges and, impose a penalty of revocation and a
bond forfeiture.118 Three of the five Commissioners, including Com-
missioner Tiliman, concurred in the dispositions. 1 9 The New York
court ruled that the SLA decision was invalid. 20 It stressed that the
defect was not the combination of functions: "The challenge here is
not to the dual investigatory/adjudicatory role of the agency. Rather
it concerns an individual's participation, as advocate for the agency's
position, in the very matter over which she is later required to pass
impartial judgment.' 2' The agency, as such, may investigate, prose-
cute, and adjudicate, but that does not mean that the same individuals
within the agency may exercise both prosecutorial and judicial func-
tions." "T'illman's role as Beer Garden's 'prosecutor' in this case was
inherently incompatible with her subsequent participation as its
Judge.... That circumstance and fundamental fairness require that
she recuse herself."'' 3
However, under National Advertisers,24 the same approach will
not be followed in a rule-making proceeding. In a Ninth Circuit case,
Alaska Factory Trawler Association v. Baldridge,'" regulations were
challenged because an agency official had participated both on the
Council which proposed the regulations and in the Secretarial review
process.' 26 The Ninth Circuit stated,
[u]nlike an adjudicative proceeding, participation by a single indi-
vidual at two different levels of the rule-making process does not
create a conflict of interest. The evidence on the record in the pres-
ent case cannot support an inference that the Regional Director's
mind was unalterably closed on the issue of the validity of [the regu-





120. Id. at 1197.
121. Id. at 1198.
122. Id. at 1199.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 12-37 and accompanying text.
125. 831 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1987).
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On the contrary, the Beer Garden case shows that in adjudication the
unalterably closed mind test is not applicable."2 Participation by the
same individual at different levels of the adjudicatory process invali-
dates the decision, even though the legislature has provided for a com-
bination of the different functions involved in the agency itself.
To public lawyers today the principle just stated is an all but obvi-
ous aspect of the right to a fair adjudication, but the law has only
recently become settled to that effect. Not long ago, the leading case
on the matter was Eisler v. United States.'29 That case involved a mo-
tion to disqualify a judge in a prosecution of a noted Communist re-
fusing to testify before the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. 3 The defendant alleged that the judge had, as Special As-
sistant to the Attorney General, been legal adviser to the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation at the time it was investigating defendant. The
defendant also claimed that "prior to his elevation to the bench the
trial judge had been the active legal adviser to the investigator in the
very investigation out of which the case arose."'' The Court of Ap-
peals held that the judge was correct in refusing to disqualify himself.
"Impersonal prejudice resulting from a judge's background or experi-
ence is not .. .within the purview of the statute" providing for
disqualification. 32
Years ago I urged that Eisler should not be followed in cases in-
volving administrative agencies.' 33 Decisions such as that in the Beer
Garden case show that the courts now follow this view, holding that an
agency official who participates in the investigation or prosecution of
the particular case should be disqualified from hearing or deciding.134
Thus, an FTC member should have disqualified himself where he had
previously participated in the case as Commission general counsel. 35
Similarly, a Civil Aeronautics Board member may not sit in a mail pay
case when he had previously been Solicitor to the Postmaster General
and had filed a brief in the case 36 and an FTC Administrative Law
128. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
129. 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 335 U.S. 857 (1948), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883
(1949). After certiorari was granted and the case was argued, Eisler fled the country and the
Court ordered certiorari to be dismissed.
130. Id. at 282.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 278.
133. BERNARD ScswARIz, ADmnzS'.ArivE LAW 312 (1976).
134. Michigan Intra-State Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 504 N.W.2d
677, 682 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), appeal denied, 519 N.W.2d 886 (Mich. 1994).
135. American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FrC, 589 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1979).
136. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 254 F.2d 90, (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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Judge may not sit if he was previously involved in the case as attorney-
adviser to a Commissioner. 37 In administrative agencies at least, par-
ticipation by the same person at different levels of the adjudicatory
process is not permitted.
V. PRE.JUDGMENT - CEMENT VERSUS CINDERELLA
Bias in administrative law is narrower than bias in Webster. If
freedom from bias is taken in the broad dictionary sense of absence of
preconceptions, 138 no one can ever have a fair trial. As Judge Jerome
Frank wrote in an oft-quoted opinion, "If... 'bias' and 'partiality' be
defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions... then no one
has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The human mind, even
at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predisposi-
tions.... Every habit constitutes a prejudgment.' 39 Plainly then, the
judge or administrative adjudicator starts with inevitable preconcep-
tions: "'a complete tabula rasa...' in the area of agency policy 'would
be evidence of a lack of qualifications, not lack of bias."''1° But does
such prejudgment constitute legal bias?
There are some types of prejudgment that give no difficulty, even
though they may help to determine the decision before-hand. The ac-
cused in an armed robbery case may not have disqualified a judge who
is known for strictness in such cases. Similarly, a member of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission known for having a vigorous policy
against concentration of ownership in broadcasting is permitted to sit
in cases involving that policy.' The same is true where a member of
an agency had expressed views as a legislator on an issue later coming
before him as an agency member,4 2 or had expressed a view on the
policy issue of whether deregulation of an industry would be benefi-
cial.143 In all of these cases, there may be a predilection toward the
given decision but it is general in nature and does not prevent the
agency members from deciding the particular case fairly.
137. Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980).
138. Bias is defined as "[a]n inclination, leaning, tendency, bent; a preponderating disposi-
tion or propensity, predisposition towards; predilection; prejudice." 1 OXFORD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY 844 (1933) (emphasis in original).
139. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943).
140. Mattes v. United States, 721 F.2d 1125, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983).
141. In re Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 20 F.C.C.2d 33 (1969).
142. Citizens for a Better Env't v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 504 N.E.2d 166 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987).
143. Michigan Intra-State Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 504 N.W.2d
677, 682 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), appeal denied, 519 N.W.2d 886 (Mich. 1994).
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Much more difficult is the case where the adjudicator makes an
advance commitment on the facts at issue in the adjudication. For-
merly the leading case in such a situation was Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Cement Institute.'" The FTC is primarily an adjudicatory
agency, but it also has power to conduct investigations into competi-
tive practices and report their results to Congress and the President.145
The FTC had conducted a full-scale investigation into the multiple
basing point system of pricing which was then prevalent in heavy in-
dustry, including the cement industry.146 The Commission reported
the results of its investigation in reports to Congress and the Presi-
dent.' 47 The reports concluded that the multiple basing point system
was an illegal price-fixing restraint of trade. 48 Individual FTC mem-
bers testified to the same effect before Congressional committee hear-
ings on the FTC investigation. 49 The FTC then filed a complaint
charging that the multiple basing point system of pricing in the cement
industry was an unfair method of competition prohibited by the FTC
Act.'50 While the proceedings were pending before the Commission,
the cement companies moved to have the Commission disqualify itself
on the ground of bias through prejudgment of the issues.15'
The FTC denial of the motion was upheld by the Supreme
Court. 52 The Commission's prejudgment did not mean an irrevoca-
bly closed mind. 53 The fact that the FTC had reached certain conclu-
sions as the result of its ex parte investigation did not mean that the
minds of its members were no longer open.' 54 In contrast to the inves-
tigative stage, the companies were now legally authorized participants
in the FTC hearing. They were free to rebut by evidence and argu-
ments the conclusions that the Commission had previously reached.1 55
Was it realistic to assume that the FrC members could approach
the issue of the basing point system with that cold neutrality of an
impartial judge of which Burke speaks? 56 After an expensive and
144. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
145. Id. at 700.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 702.
149. Id. at 700.
150. Id. at 688.
151. Id. at 700.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 701.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652 n.4 (2d Cir. 1943) (citing KENNETH
BucE, PERmANNcE AND C G E 329 (1936)).
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time-consuming investigation, the Commissioners had publicly an-
nounced their conclusion that the price system was illegal. Was there
actually a chance that the cement companies could produce evidence
and arguments to persuade the Commission to repudiate its
conclusion?
What about cases where the member of an optometry board had
stated prior to a license revocation hearing that "Dr. Reid would be
losing his license"? 15 7 Or an environmental agency member had
stated, "[i]f eight saints stand on their head, I still won't vote for [peti-
tioner]"? 158 Or where an SEC member made a speech while a case
was pending on an order permanently barring petitioner from employ-
ment in the securities business, which stated that petitioner "can be
appropriately termed a violator" and that "his bar from association
with a broker-dealer was made permanent"? 59
In all these cases, Cement Institute would allow the adjudicator to
sit. But Cement Institute is no longer followed, except in rule-making
cases, even though it has never been overruled by the highest Court.
This changed attitude toward Cement Institute prejudgment is shown
in 1616 Second Avenue Restaurant, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Au-
thority.160 This 1990 New York decision held that public statements
made by the Chairman of the State Liquor Authority (SLA) concern-
ing charges then pending in an SLA proceeding disqualified the
Chairman from participating in the administrative review process.' 6
Both the accused killer and the victim in the highly publicized so-
called "preppie murder" case had been in petitioner restaurant shortly
before the crime.162 Petitioner had then been charged by the SLA
with selling liquor to underage patrons.' 63 Two of the charges were
sustained after hearing by an ALJ.164 Just before the hearing, the
SLA Chairman testified before a legislative Committee. 65 His state-
ment indicated that petitioner was guilty and "I am going to bring
157. Reid v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 589 P.2d 198 (N.M. 1979).
158. A.R.F. Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 528 N.E.2d 390, 392, 394-95 (IM. Ct.
App.), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 398 (II. 1988).
159. Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990)
(emphasis omitted).
160. 550 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1990).
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[petitioner] to justice."' 66 The Chairman refused to disqualify himself
from sitting on review of the AJ decision.167
In these circumstances, the Court ruled that the SLA decision
must be annulled. 68 The Court distinguished prejudgment of the
facts from prejudgment of a legal issue.169 Here, the Chairman's
testimony could only be regarded by a disinterested observer as evi-
dencing [his] belief that petitioner had in fact violated the law re-
garding the sale of alcohol to minors and his commitment to
establishing that fact in the SLA proceeding.... [T]hat im pression
lent an impermissible air of unfairness to the proceeding.' 0
Where an agency official evinces such prejudgment, he must disqualify
himself. In such a case, "a disinterested observer may conclude that
[he] has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a
particular case in advance of hearing it.' '17 1
Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC.172 is now the
leading case on the Cement Institute type of prejudgment, even though
it was decided by a federal court of appeals, not the Supreme Court.
In Cinderella, the FTC had charged that Cinderella made false repre-
sentations in its advertising and engaged in deceptive practices in con-
travention of the FTC Act.173 As an example, the Commission
alleged that Cinderella advertised "courses in instruction which qual-
ify students to become airline stewardesses" and that its graduates
were "qualified to assume executive positions."' 74 The hearing exam-
iner ruled that the Commission had failed to prove that the acts and
practices violated the FTC Act, and he dismissed the complaint.175
Complaint counsel appealed to the Commission. While the appeal
was pending before the Commission, the FrC Chairman gave a
speech before a newspaper association in which he asked,
[w]hat standards are maintained on advertising acceptance? ...
What about carrying ads that offer college educations in five weeks,
... or becoming an airline's hostess by attending charm school? ...
166. Id. at 913.
167. Id. at 910.
168. Id. at 914.
169. Id. at 912.
170. Id. at 913.
171. Id. at 912 (quoting Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461,469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 896 (1959)).
172. 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
173. Id. at 584.
174. Id. at 584 n.1.
175. Id at 584.
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Granted that newspapers are not in the advertising policing busi-
ness, their advertising managers are savvy enough to smell decep-
tion when the odor is strong enough.176
Some months later, the Commission, with the Chairman participating,
found that Cinderella neither awarded nor was capable of awarding
academic degrees, and that it offered no course of instruction which
would qualify students as airline stewardesses.177 The Commission
concluded that these and other representations were false and mis-
leading in violation of the FTC Act.178
The D.C. Circuit Court vacated the FTC order and remanded to
the Commission without participation of the Chairman.179 The Chair-
man's speech gave the appearance that he had prejudged the case.
"Conduct such as this may have the effect of entrenching a Commis-
sioner in a position which he has publicly stated, making it difficult, if
not impossible, for him to reach a different conclusion.., after con-
sideration of the record."' In effect, the Chairman had "give[n] the
appearance that he ha[d] already prejudged the case and that the ulti-
mate determination of the merits [would] move in predestined
grooves.' 181 Instead of Cement Institute's closed mind test, the D.C.
Circuit stated that the test was whether "a disinterested observer may
conclude that [the agency] has in some measure adjudged the facts as
well as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing it.' '1""
The Cinderella view of a "neutral and detached adjudicator"' 83 is
more consistent with the demands of fair procedure than the Cement
Institute license for the adjudicator to sit unless it can be shown that he
has an irrevocably closed mind. The Cement Institute test, like that in
the [previously discussed National Advertisers case above], "im-
pose[es] a practically impossible impediment... to a showing of bias,
even when the decisionmaker has in fact made up his mind in advance
of the hearing.""' The Cement Institute fact-pattern shows that this is
true. As asked above, was there really any chance for the cement
companies to persuade the FTC to repudiate its already announced
176. Id. at 589-90 (emphasis omitted).
177. Cf. id, at 584.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 592.
180. Id. at 590.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 591 (quoting Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 896 (1959)).
183. Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FrC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S.Ct. 3011 (1980).
184. Id. at 1196 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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conclusion that the companies' pricing system was illegal? "Since the
Commission had made an extensive investigation and full study before
making elaborate reports to Congress and to the President,... the
probability of something in the nature of closed minds seems
strong."'185
Indeed, as the Davis and Pierce treatise concludes on Cement In-
stitute, "as a practical matter, it makes proof of closed minds virtually
impossible."' 86 It is scarcely surprising then that no adjudicator has
been "held disqualified on account of closed minds, because proof of
closed minds is normally impossible and because an allegation of
closed minds is likely to bring the response the Court gave in the Ce-
ment Institute case."' 87 How can anyone prove that an adjudicator not
only has prejudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case, but
that his mind was irrevocable closed on the matter?
Cinderella has, however, now superseded Cement Institute as the
governing standard. Not only did the National Advertisers court state
the Cinderella test as the standard for disqualification in adjudica-
tions,1R8 other federal courts have done so as well. For example, in
Antoniu v. SEC,'89 the Eighth Circuit set aside an SEC order perma-
nently barring petitioner from employment in the securities business
because of an SEC commissioner's speech while the case was pending,
in which he stated that petitioner "can be appropriately termed a vio-
lator" and that "his bar from association with a broker-dealer was
made permanent." 90 The Eighth Circuit specifically adopted the Cin-
derella text as the governing standard.191 The same has been true in
some states. As discussed above, in 1616 Second Avenue, 192 New
York disqualified an administrative adjudicator under the Cinderella
test.' 93 Recent cases in other states also support the proposition that
it is now Cinderella, not Cement Institute, that sets the standard for
adjudicatory disqualification in prejudgment cases.19a
185. 2 KENNm CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 9.8 at 84 (3d ed. 1994).
186. Id.
187. Id
188. National Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1158.
189. 877 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
190. Id. at 723.
191. ld. at 725; see also Committee of 100 on the Federal City v. Hodel, 777 F.2d 711, 721
(D.C. Cir. 1985); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
192. 1616 Second Avenue Restaurant, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 550 N.E.2d
910 (N.Y. 1990).
193. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
194. E.g., Havasu Heights Ranch and Dev. Corp. v. Desert Valley Wood Prod., Inc., 807 P.2d
1119,1123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); deKoevend v. Board of Educ. of West End Sch. Dist. RE-2, 688
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VI. PRECEDENT OR "SPORT"?
Bias in administrative law is still not the same as bias in Webster.
However, the recent jurisprudence discussed in this article has
brought the two closer together. Most people would find it difficult to
believe that they would get a fair trial before an adjudicator who has
been on the other side at a prior stage of the case or who has publicly
prejudged the issues in the case. Yet, not long ago, the adjudicator
might not be disqualified in either case. The Eisler rule refused to
disqualify the adjudicator even though he had been active adviser to
the FBI while it was conducting the investigation that led to the crimi-
nal case in which the adjudicator sat.195 The Cement Institute rule re-
fused to disqualify the adjudicator who had prejudged the case unless
it was proved that he had an irrevocably closed mind - something
that, in practice, is impossible to prove.'9 6 Certainly, both situations
would come within the dictionary definition of bias.
Under the recent cases discussed, they also now come within the
concept of legal bias. Eisler has not been specifically repudiated. 97
All the same, at least in administrative agencies, participation by the
same person at different levels of the adjudicatory process is not per-
mitted by the recent cases. Similarly, Cement Institute has not been
overruled or even modified by the Supreme Court. Yet its irrevocably
closed mind test is no longer followed, except in rule-making proceed-
ings. Instead, Cinderella is now the governing standard.198 The test in
prejudgment cases is now whether a disinterested observer might con-
clude that the administrative adjudicator has to some extent adjudged
the facts as well as the law of a case before the agency decides it.
Unlike the Cement Institute test, this standard, as Cinderella itself
P.2d 219, 228 (Colo. 1984); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Fulkerson, 680 P.2d 1325, 1327
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Clisham v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 613 A.2d 254,259 (Conn. 1992); E
& E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 451 N.E.2d 555, 565 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983), affd, 481
N.E.2d 664 (Ill. 1985); Butler v. Department of Pub. Safety and Corrections, 609 So.2d 790, 794
(La. 1992); In re Rollins Envtl Servs., Inc., 481 So.2d 113, 120 (La. 1985), affd, 481 N.E.2d 664
(1985); American Recovery Co. v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 506 A.2d 1171,
1177 (Md. 1986); Consumer Protection Div. v. Consumer Publishing Co., 501 A.2d 48, 66 (Md.
1985); Winslow v. Holdemess Planning Bd., 480 A.2d 114, 117 (N.H. 1984); Appeal of Lathrop,
444 A.2d 505, 507 (N.H. 1982); Tennessee Cable Television Ass'n v. Tennessee Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 844 S.W.2d 151, 165 (Tenn. Ct. App.), appeal denied, (1992).
195. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
197. One may question, however, whether Eisler would be followed in cases involving judges
today. But see Carter v. Carter, 615 A.2d 197, 199 (D.C. 1992) (implying that Eisler is still good
law in such cases).
198. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text
1995]
23
Schwartz: Bias in Webster and Bias in Administrative Law--The Recent Jurisp
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
shows, can be used to disqualify adjudicators who would come within
both the dictionary and common perception of prejudice.
In conclusion, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma
Corporation Commission represents a step backwards, running
counter to the trend to broaden the legal conception of bias. To hold
that, in rate-making, there is no requirement of an impartial decision-
maker is to turn back the administrative law clock by more than a
century, since, as seen, the Supreme Court as early as 1884 indicated
that rates must be fixed by an impartial tribunal. 199 One can only
hope that the Southwestern Bell decision will prove to be sui generis -
without value as a precedent. May we not go even further and treat
the decision as what biologists call a "sport" - a genetic oddity defy-
ing explanation, but not signifying mutation?2"
199. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 364 (1884).
200. Cf. Thomas Reed Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV.
L. REV. 757, 783 (1945).
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